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Bureaucracy and the flypaper effect: Evidence
from intercommunal fiscal equalisation in the 
canton of Vaud*
Fabio Cappelletti**, Nils Soguel***
Unlike classical theoretical expectations, our empirical study shows 
that financial transfers to decentralised governments increase local 
public expenditures much more than would be triggered by an 
equivalent rise in local income. This empirical evidence of the presence 
of a flypaper effect is achieved using panel data from 375 
municipalities located in the Swiss canton of Vaud covering the period 
1994 to 2005. During that time there was a major change in the 
financial equalisation scheme. Furthermore, our study confirms the 
analysis of the public choice theory: the effect depends partly on the 
degree of complexity of the municipal bureaucracy. These results show 
that local bureaucratic behaviour may impede the effectiveness of a 
financial equalisation scheme that aims to reduce disparities in local 
tax.
Keywords: Intergovernmental grants, flypaper effect, subnational 
governments, bureaucracy behaviour, fiscal federalism
JEL classification: D73, H40, H77
A diferencia de las clásicas expectativas teóricas, nuestro estudio 
empírico muestra que las transferencias financieras a los gobiernos 
descentralizados incrementan los gastos públicos locales mucho más de 
lo que podría hacerlo  un aumento equivalente de la renta local. A la 
evidencia empírica de la presencia de un efecto flypaper llegamos 
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utilizando datos de panel de 375 municipios localizados en el cantón 
suizo de Vaud, para el período 1994 - 2005. Durante ese tiempo hubo 
un cambio importante en el esquema de perecuación financiera. 
Además, se confirma el análisis de la teoría de la public choice: el efecto 
depende en parte del grado de complejidad de la burocracia municipal. 
Estos resultados muestran que el comportamiento burocrático local 
puede impedir la efectividad de un esquema de perecuación financiera 
que tiene por objetivo reducir las disparidades en la imposición local.
Introduction
Equity considerations call for grants in favour of poorer jurisdictions (i.e. 
with a weaker fiscal capacity) in order to avoid the situation that two 
identical taxpayers living in two different jurisdictions could end up pay-
ing a very different tax bill for the same amount of public services. Accord-
ing to the classical theory of fiscal federalism, lump-sum general grants1(i.e. 
grants determined exogenously and freely usable by the beneficiary juris-
diction) are preferable to any other form of grant when the aim is to 
reduce such inequalities. This normative affirmation is based on the 
expectation that lump-sum general grants produce the same effects as an 
equivalent increase of taxpayer income (Bradford and Oates 1971).
In contrast, matching and specific grants (i.e. grants determined on 
grantee expenditures and on which the grantor imposes some conditions 
of use) are considered an inadequate instrument of fiscal equalisation. 
In fact, these grants are not transparent because they also pursue alloca-
tive goals. In addition, the size of the grant being a function of the 
expenditure related to the provision of a specific public service, such grants 
affect the relative price of public services in the grantee communities. In 
this way, they induce the grantee communities to increase their spending 
rather than lower their tax rates as generally aimed (Dafflon 1995: 23).
Until recently, the instruments adopted by the Confederation and the 
26 cantons to mitigate fiscal inequalities, both between cantons or between 
municipalities, clearly belonged to the latter kind of grants. Thus, before 
the adoption of the new fiscal equalisation and division of tasks between 
the Confederation and the cantons (RPT) in 2008, the equalisation of 
cantonal fiscal capacity was done in an unsatisfactory way through the 
1 For a larger description and discussion of each kind of existing grant see King (1984: 
86ff.).
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addition of an equalisation component to several federal matching and 
specific grants. These components took the form of a higher rate of sub-
sidising when such grants were aimed ata canton identified as fiscally 
weak (see Dafflon 2004). The same instruments were used by most can-
tons to reduce inequalities in municipal tax rates (Soguel 2004).
The main argument mobilised in favour of the 2008 reform focused 
on the efficiency gains arising from suppressing any cantonal incitation 
to excessively increase their expenditures. This suppression was possible 
by moving toward a fiscal equalisation based on general grants (Mottu 
1997, FC 2001: 2227). In the cantons, the same considerations progres-
sively led their fiscal equalisation to rely more and more on general grants 
rather than on matching and specific grants (Mischler and Dafflon 2003). 
Indeed, despite the many reforms already undertaken in this policy area 
between 1990 and 1999 (Widmer and Rieder 2003: 204), in 2001 an over-
whelming majority of the cantonal chancellery (21) attributed great 
importance to the reform of its cantonal fiscal equalisation2.
However, several empirical studies question the theoretical expectations 
of the effects of lump-sum general grants (Hines and Thaler 1995). Accord-
ing to these studies, these grants stimulate the expenditures of the grant-
ed jurisdiction more than expected and therefore lead only to a slight 
reduction of the tax burden. This phenomenon is called the “flypaper 
effect” following the assertion of Arthur Okun that “it appears that the 
grantor’s money tends to stick in whichever sector (public or private) it arrives” 
(quoted in King 1984: 102). 
The limits of a purely economic approach to the analysis of fiscal 
equalisation have been already reported in the recent literature on fiscal 
federalism. Among these limitations, it is now largely recognised that it 
is not possible to formulate theoretical expectations about the impact of 
political reforms while ignoring the political context in which these 
reforms unfold. In particular, Oates (2005) underlines the necessity of 
looking at how political actors may divert the objectives of a reform in 
order to better pursue their personal interests at the expense of voters and 
taxpayers. Similar to the concerns of the public choice school, this obser-
vation led to the development of various explanations of the flypaper 
effect (see Bailey and Connolly 1998).
2 Source: IDHEAP/BADAC, Database of the cantons. Importance of reform projects. 
Vertical fiscal equalisation (canton-municipalities). 2001 (C4.22c). Page viewed the 
10.09.2013, 14h.
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The aim of this paper is to illustrate and empirically test the founda-
tions of the alleged relationship between bureaucratic complexity and the 
size of the flypaper effect at the local level. The hypothesis of such a rela-
tionship is based on the improvement of the model proposed by King 
(1984) using the insights of Breton and Wintrobe (1975) regarding the 
popular model of bureaucratic behaviourbyNiskanen (1968, 1975). Our 
argument is that the higher the bureaucratic complexity of a municipal-
ity, the higher the cost to supervise its activity in terms of other actors 
(politicians and/or voters), and then the higher the autonomy of the 
local bureaucrats in the definition of the public spending. Since local 
bureaucrats have preferences for a higher expenditure level than the 
other actors, this should lead to a larger flypaper effect in the granted 
municipalities with a higher bureaucratic complexity.
Section One presents the classical model of fiscal federalism, King’s 
model and our alternative model of partial bureaucratic power. Section Two 
presents our empirical field: a rich dataset covering 224 municipalities of 
the canton of Vaud between 1994 and 2005 (12 years). These data are par-
ticularly interesting because since the reform of cantonal fiscal equalisation 
was implemented in 2001, these municipalities received equalisation grants 
having the same characteristics of lump-sum general grants. Section Three 
focuses onthe empirical approach, presentation and discussion ofresults.A 
regression analysisis conducted totest whether these equalisation grants 
lead to a flypaper effect in the recipient municipalities. In addition, we also 
check whether this effect is homogeneous for every municipality or varies 
according to the local bureaucratic complexity. Finally, in our conclusion 
we summarise our results and present some suggestions.
Theoretical framework
1. Classical theory on intergovernmental grants
The traditional theory on the impact of lump-sum general grants on pub-
lic budgets relies on a median voter demand model as shown in Figure 13. 
In this model, the grantee community is seen as an individual decision-
maker having the same preferences as the local median voter. Based on 
that, the model predicts that an increase in disposable income should 
have a similar influence on public expenditures as the receipt of a gen-
3 See King (1985: 88-90) for a larger overview and discussion on the postulates of the 
classical model.
42 43
eral grant of the same amount (Bradford and Oates 1971, Shah 2007). 
The model demonstrates this by assigning an income expansion path R 
to the community. This path illustrates how community demand for 
private and public goods varies with the rise in disposable income. The 
point e0 represents the ideal consumption of these two goods under the 
budget constraint PP’ according to the preferences between public and 
private goods consumption of the community as mapped by the indiffer-
ence curve I0. Private goods can be interpreted as the amount left to free 
disposal of the citizen-taxpayers. Public goods correspond to the expen-
ditures financed by local taxes. In this initial situation, the local com-
munity receives no grant.
Figure 1: Impact of a general grant according to the classical median 
voter model
Consider now the impact of a lump-sum general grant on the general 
equilibrium. Schematically, the amount received by the grantee commu-
nity, measured in terms of potential additional consumption of public 
goods, is equal to the distance P’T’. Measured in terms of potential addi-
tional consumption of private goods, it is the distance PT. As a result of 
the grant, the budget constraint therefore moves parallel from PP’ to TT’. 
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Let us recall that a general grant (as opposed to a specific one) could be 
allocated in any proportion between public and private goods. Also note 
that the model is entirely based on the grantee community. Thus, the 
theoretical expectations are the same independently of the horizontal 
(between communities of the same institutional level) or vertical (between 
communities of different institutional levels) nature of the grant4.
Given the indifference map, the new optimum is established at the 
point of tangency eTbetween the indifference curb IT and the new budg-
et constraint TT’. The amount of private goods consumed increases from 
X0 to XT, the public goods from G0 to GT. Observe that these movements 
would have been exactly the same if the community would have seen its 
disposable income increase by the same amount of the grant (for example 
as a result of economic growth). In fact, in such a case, we will also see 
a translation of the budget constraint equal to PT (or P’T’). To sum up, 
the classical theory justifies the expectation that a general grant increas-
es public spending by the income elasticity of median voter demand (Culis 
and Jones 2009: 388).
2. Disharmony of interests and the flypaper effect
Contrary to expectations based on the classical model, several empirical 
studies have concluded that general grants led to an excessive rise in public 
spending in the recipient community, and to too little tax relief, and were not 
spent in the same way as any other increase in the community income (Brennan 
and Pincus 1996: 230). This phenomenon, the flypaper effect, has been 
mainly studied in the United States5. The salient finding is that the impact 
on public spending (i.e. on the consumption of public goods) of general 
grants is 5 to 10 times higher than that arising from an increase in dispos-
able income. Similar results were obtained concerning other federal states 
such as Australia (Dollery and Worthington 1995), Belgium (Heyndels and 
Smolders 1994) or Canada (Winer 1983, Hammes and Willis 1987). How-
ever, European studies show little interest in this phenomenon.
The clash of interests between the median voter and other actors active 
in the decision-making processes has immediately been raised as an expla-
4 However, in the case of a horizontal grant, the possibility that some collectivities could 
move from the grantee to the grantor condition has to be taken in account. We will 
discuss this in the next section.
5 For an overview see Bailey and Connolly (1998), Hines and Thaler (1995) and Gramlich 
(1977).
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nation for the flypaper effect (Wilde 1968, Gramlich 1977). The main 
model taking this conflict into account is the application by King (1984) 
of the model of bureaucratic behaviour formerly popularised by Niskanen 
(1968). The idea behind this model is to temper the classical model with 
a public choice perspective. According to Niskanen (1975), the public 
budget is the result of a negotiation between the representatives of the 
median voter (the sponsor) and the members of the bureaucracy (the 
bureau). The sponsor and the bureau have conflicting interests: the first 
seeks to ensure his reelection by maximising the welfare of the median 
voter6, the second tries to maximise the public budget because his pay, 
power and prestige increase with it (Culis and Jones, 2009: 389). In 
other words, the sponsor desires a production of public goods as close as 
possible to the one demanded by the median voter (exactly what is pre-
dicted by the classical model) and the bureau to a far higher one.
The relationship between the sponsor and the bureau could be modelled 
as a bilateral monopoly. The bargaining refers to the amount of public 
goods to be produced by the bureau and the allocated budget to this pro-
duction. However, the two actors do not possess the same bargaining 
power: two factors clearly strengthen the power of the bureau at the 
expense of the sponsor. First, the bureau is the only entity that is aware 
of the public goods production function and could then conceal this 
information from the sponsor and thereby create a clear asymmetry of 
information. Second, the bureau has an agenda-setting power through 
which it could limit the possibilities for the sponsor to amend budget 
proposals.7
A lot of scholars consider these two factors (asymmetry of information 
and agenda-setting power) strong enough to allow the bureau to impose 
public goods production identical to the one which could be imposed by 
a private monopolist (Wyckoff 1991: 331). Because of this, the bureau can 
6 The fidelity of politicians to median voter demands could also be questioned. McGuire 
(1975) observes that the flypaper effect could be explained by the action of spending-
maximising politicians. However, this kind of additional explanation does not call 
into question the contribution of the bureaucratic behaviour model: Bailey and Con-
nolly (1998: 346) note that both politician and bureaucrat behaviour could contribu-
te to explain the flypaper effect. In order to clarify our approach, in this paper we focus 
only on the bureaucratic behaviour.
7 See Romer and Rosenthal (1979) for a more general model relying on the idea of agenda-
setting power.
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choose any level of production provided that it does not exceed available 
revenues. In addition, it must make sure that the sponsor does not come 
to the conclusion that the suppression of the bureau offers more benefits 
than keeping it active. The maximal budget under these two conditions 
is realised when the bureau chooses a public goods production level that 
equalises total benefits (BT) with total costs (CT) as Figure 2 illustrates. 
The horizontal axis measures the quantity G of public goods produced by 
the bureau. The BM curve reflects the average benefit provided to citizens 
(BM=BT/G). The CM curve reflects the average cost of production before 
the grant (CT=CM/G). The resulting equilibrium point eB allows the 
bureau to produce the quantity of public goods GB with a budget that 
leaves the sponsor indifferent or marginally in favour of maintaining the 
bureau. However, the sponsor loses a part of net surplus compared to the 
social optimum where the marginal cost Cm equalises the marginal ben-
efit Bm (equilibrium point e0 with a quantity G0 lower than GB).
8 It 
should be noted that G0 is the quantity of public goods produced accord-
ing to the classical model.
Figure 2: Bureaucratic behaviour and effect of general grants
8 The loss of surplus for the sponsor when moving from e0 to eB (and from G0 to GB) 
is equal to e0VM.
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Figure 2 also illustrates the effect of bureaucratic behaviour after a general 
grant is received. Following King, because of the monopoly status of the bureauc-
racy, the received grant should be entirely captured by the public budget, or 
even cause an additional increase in expenditures. Indeed, a general grant 
reduces the average cost to be financed by the sponsor as showed by the curve 
C’M.
9 According to this information, the sponsor is willing to accept an increase 
in production from GB to GTB with a new equilibrium point eTB. In this case, 
the reduction of the average cost is entirely funded by the grant eTBCDE that 
becomes part of the budget available to the office.This budget passes from 
eBGB0B to ODEGTB. What remains is to find a additional funding equivalent 
to eTBGTBGBK-eBKCB (e.g.: through a tax increase). In other words, the grant 
leads to an increase in expenditures greater than the amount received. The total 
profit goes fromOLMGB to OLNGTB, with an increase of GBMNGTB lower 
than the cost increase GBVWGTB.
3. Cost to control the bureau and the flypaper effect
According to Miller and Moe (1983), the monopoly power of the bureau 
described by Niskanen results solely from the inability of the sponsor to 
adopt the appropriate tools to better monitor the activity of the first. The 
magnitude of the flypaper effect generated by the bureaucratic behaviour 
is then seen as a function of the way the legislature organises itself for decision 
making (p. 320). Similarly, Conybeare (1984) observes that restoring a rea-
sonable degree of bilateral monopoly to the problem produces results more con-
sistent with the empirical evidence (p. 498). For these authors, the flypaper 
effect caused by the bureaucratic behaviour could vary between communi-
ties depending on the power relationship between bureau and sponsor.
We take this in consideration by applying to the previous model some 
changes based on these originally proposed by Breton and Wintrobe (1975) 
in regards to Niskanen’s model. The difference between the optimal 
budget for the sponsor and the one obtained by the bureau can be reduced 
through various instruments serving to control costs and as a deterrent 
against distortion of information (Breton and Wintrobe 1975: 199). Figure 
3 models the search for an optimal volume of control for the sponsor.10 
9 In the case of a lump-sum general grant, the mean transfer per unit of public goods 
decreases with the increase of G. Thus, the vertical distance between the curb CM and 
the curb C’M also decreases with the increase of G.
10 The notion of control should be understood in a broad sense including the seeking for 
better information and/or a better decision-making framework.
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The LR curve represents the marginal cost of using additional (or more 
sophisticated) control instruments. The higher the volume of control, the 
easier it will be for the sponsor to force the bureau to adopt a budget 
closer to the one desired by the median voter (i.e. the one predicted by 
the classical model). The maximum benefit arising from the use of these 
tools is then equal to the budget requests of the office beyond the optimal 
budget for the sponsor. This benefit is illustrated by the curve of mar-
ginal benefit HJ. At the point J, the marginal benefit is zero because the 
control is so strict (albeit very expensive at the margin) that it prevents 
any difference between the two desired budgets. The optimal volume of 
control K is the one for which the marginal benefit equals the marginal 
control cost. The sponsor reduces by the amount OHIK the excessive 
spending arising from the bureaucratical behaviour at the cost OLIK. The 
total budget (including control costs) is then lowered by the amount LHI 
and is in such a way closer to the one preferred by the median voter.
Figure 3: Optimal volume of control for the sponsor
The size of the LHI area depends on the marginal cost of the control. 
On the one hand, the marginal cost could vary according to the cost of 
the disposable control technology (Breton and Wintrobe 1975: 202). On 
the other hand, the complexity of the bureaucracy could increase the 
control costs (Tullock 1975). In this paper we focus on this second factor, 
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because it is the one for which differences between communities gener-
ally occurs. A larger bureaucratic complexity leads to a displacement of 
the LR curves upward and then moves K to the left. This movement 
mechanically decreases the area LHI and then increases the difference 
between the adopted budget and the one desired by the median voter and 
then by the sponsor.
The increase in cost is not necessarily linear. Indeed, a large bureauc-
racy comes with more complexity due to the specialisation of the public 
servants, the ramification of the flowcharts and the diffusion and/or 
juxtaposition of tasks and responsibilities. Bureaucratic activity then 
becomes more difficult to grasp for the bodies in charge of its monitoring. 
In terms of the flypaper effect, this kind of relationship between bureau-
cratic complexity and the control cost becomes a larger phenomenon in 
communities with a complex bureaucracy than in communities with a 
simpler bureaucracy.
Empirical Field: the new fiscal equalisation in the canton of Vaud
This section explains how the previous theoretical framework applies to 
our empirical field: the case of the intermunicipal fiscal equalisation 
2001-2005 in the canton of Vaud. Until the end of the year 2000, the 
canton of Vaud applied an indirect form of fiscal equalisation in order to 
reduce the fiscal inequalities between its municipalities11. These transfers, 
called equalisation supplements (“supplémentspéréquatifs”),were close-
ly linked with a number of vertical specific matching grants12. The 375 
municipalities were classified according to their fiscal capacity into 13 
groups having the right to a different rate of subsidising: the lower the 
fiscal capacity of a municipality the higher was the subsidising rate used 
to determine the grants in itsfavour. This system was a source of ineffi-
ciencies and failed to reduce the fiscal gap between richer and poorer 
municipalities.
In 2001, a horizontal fiscal equalisation was introduced as part of a 
larger reform project (EtaCom) which aimed to disentangle the relations 
between the canton and the municipalities and so the equalisation sup-
plements were progressively suppressed. The goal of the new fiscal equal-
11 See Soguel and Tangerini (2002) for a larger description and criticism of the equalisa-
tion supplements system.
12 In the last year of application, the grants involved were those for school building, repair 
of roads and sidewalks, water treatment, waste management and forestry projects.
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isation was to reduce the gap between the higher and the lower local tax 
rates. This had to be achieved with an equalisation fundfully financed 
by the municipalities according to their tax capacityonly and redistrib-
uted between them according to a complex formula based not only on 
theirtax capacity (with a weight of 50%), but also their needs (33.3%) 
andtheir tax effort (16.7%). Table 1 illustrates the number of net recip-
ients and net payers, and the mean and median per capita transfer in 
CHF (either gain or loss) for the years 2001-2002, 2003-2004 and 2005. 
A higher number of grantee municipalities compared to grantor ones 
was observed and the net gains are spread in a more normal way than 
the net losses.
Table 1: Descriptive data on the transfers generated by the fiscal 
equalisation
  2001-2002 2003-2004 2005
Grantees (N) 261 245 233
Mean gain (CHF) 154 128 127
Median gain (CHF) 163 131 123
Grantors (N) 109 125 142
Mean loss (CHF) 294 337 331
Median loss (CHF) 195 195 194
Source: Statistical service of the canton of Vaud (STATVD)
The literature indicates the mis-specification of grant type as a com-
mon mistake in many empirical contributions (Bailey and Connolly 1998: 
339-340). It is then worthwhileto analyse in which way such transfers 
could be assimilated to lump-sum general grants as required by the theo-
retical models previously illustrated. These transfers could be assimilated 
without much discussion to general grants because they are freely usable 
by the municipalities in order to increase expenditures, decrease tax bur-
dens or a mix of both. King (1984: 87-88) identifies two kind of general 
grants: lump-sum general grants and effort-related general grants. In the 
first case, the amount of the grant is fixed. In the second case, the amount 
of the grant depends on the actions of the grantee. Inevitably, the second 
kind of grant could generate a price-effect similar to a matching grant.
In order to apply our theoretical model, we haveto demonstrate that 
the municipalities have no control on the formula used to determine the 
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transfers.In our situation, this seems to be the largely the case. On the 
one hand, since tax capacity depends on the tax revenues per capita raised 
by the canton in each municipality, it escapes municipal control. On the 
other hand, despite the apparent complexity of the “needs” factors, the 
only indicator used in this case is the size of the local population. This is 
clearly an indicator which is impossible for any municipalityto manipu-
late.
Some doubts may be raised regarding the tax effort part of the for-
mula. In fact, this factor depends on the tax rate applied by each munic-
ipality: the higher the tax rate, the higher the gains from the fiscal equal-
isation. Therefore, a municipality could potentially increase (or refuse to 
decrease) its tax rate in order get more from (or pay less to) the equalisa-
tion fund. This incentive is weak because the fiscal effort takes the small-
er weighting of all the others components of the formula (16.7%) and 
then weakly influences the amount of the grants.It should also be noted 
that the tax capacity does not only influence the distribution formula, 
but it is also the only factor that determines the financing of the equali-
sation fund. Then, its contribution to the determination of the equalisa-
tion grants is much higher than 50%. Thus, we can by and large consider 
the transfers of Vaud’s fiscal equalisation as lump-sum general grants. 
However, because of the tax effort part of the formula, we will be very 
careful with interpretation in the eventof a weak flypaper effect.
All empirical contributions on the flypaper effect, with only some 
minor exceptions, cover the case of a vertical transfer from the federal 
state toward states or from a state toward its municipalities. In our case, 
the transfers are purely horizontal: what the net beneficiary municipali-
ties get is directly paid by the other municipalities. In order to maintain 
a high degree of similaritywith existing empirical works, our analysis will 
cover only the 224 municipalities that were net beneficiaries of fiscal 
equalisation on every year between 2001 and 2005. It could have been 
possible to also analyse the other cases. In fact, the literature offers some 
examples of analysis onthe impact of disappearing grants on public budg-
ets (Gamkhar and Oates 1996, Stine 1994). This situation is similar to the 
one faced by grantor municipalities. However, there exists a strong co-
linearity between the net losses and the income of the municipalities and 
this raises overwhelming econometrical problems, something which is 
not the case when only municipalities experiencing net gains are retained 
in the sample.
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Methodological section
1. Model specification
The methodology used to test the existence of the flypaper effect and its 
explanatory factors consisted of two distinct phases (Dollery and Wor-
thington 1996: 262). To begin, the expenditures of the municipalities 
wereregressed against the community median income, the amount of 
lump-sum global grants received and contextual variables acting as control 
variables. In our case, given the panel form of the data, the model to 
estimate takes the form of equation 1:
 [1]
EXPit are the public expenditures of each municipality i for every year t, 
TOWNi are the fixed effects for each municipality, INCit is median income 
of the taxpayers in each municipality, PHit is the net amount received by 
each municipality because of the fiscal equalisation, X a vector of n other 
explanatory variables and a the coefficients to estimate. In addition, a 
trend variable YEAR (having a value between 1 and 12 for each of the twelve 
years analysed) was introduced because the local public expenditures his-
torically display an upward trend. This way, we avoided falsely attributing 
this historical evolution to the equalisation grants (Brooks and Philips 
2008: 254). Finally, the equation is estimated using standard-errors clus-
tered at the municipality level as suggested by Moulton (1990).
The comparison between the estimated coefficients a1 and a2 enables 
us to see whether the fiscal equalisation in the canton of Vaud generates 
a flypaper effect or not. A non-significant difference between the two 
means that the classical model alone is enough to predict the impact of 
the fiscal equalisation: identical amounts of equalisation and income 
increase leads to the same increase of the public expenditures. In contrast, 
a significant difference with a2>a1 indicates the existence of a flypaper 
effect equal to the difference between the two coefficients. The eventual 
case with a1>a2 is not covered by our theoretical framework.
If a flypaper effect is identified, the initial model is usually extended 
to test the link between the magnitude of this phenomenon and several 
factors which, according to theory, should influence it. The empirical 
literature on the link between bureaucracy and flypaper effect is limited. 
To our knowledge, only two testing strategies exist. Strumpf (1998) uses 
a variable obtained by interaction between a variable equivalent to our 
52 53
variable PH and an indicator of citizen attention on political and admin-
istrative activity. Bae and Feiock (2004) adopt a less demanding strategy. 
First, they split their municipality sample into two categories according 
to form of government. Then, they form a binary variable reflecting the 
membership of each municipality to the first category and create a test 
variable from the interaction of this dummy and a variable similar to 
PH.
Our theoretical model predicts a positive relationship between the 
bureaucratic complexity and the magnitude of the flypaper effect. How-
ever, they provide no information about the functional form of this 
relationship. This is the reason why we use a strategy similar to that of 
Bae and Feiock. As a first step, we split our sample into three municipal-
ity groups according to the complexity of their administration (high, 
moderate, low). These groups are distinguished using the categorical 
variable B, with B+=1 when the municipality has a very complex bureauc-
racy (0 otherwise), B-=1 when the bureaucracy has a low complexity, B+=0 
and B-=0 when the bureaucratic complexity is at an intermediary level. 
We illustrate the criteria used to operationalize this variable in the next 
section. In a second step, we interact the variable B with our variable PH 
(equation 2).
This equation enables us to test whether the municipalities in the two 
extreme categories (+, -) have a flypaper effect that is significantly differ-
ent from the one observed for the municipalities with an intermediary 
bureaucratic complexity. This will be the case if the coefficients a4 and 
a5 differ significantly from zero. In addition, our theoretical expectations 
are to observe a positive sign for a4 and a negative one for a5.
2. Operationalisation of the main variables
The empirical literature on the flypaper effect usually uses one of two 
types of indicators as dependent variable: total or per capita current 
expenditures (Dollery and Worthington 1996) and expenditures by func-
tion with a focus on educational spending (Feldstein 1975, Bowman 
1974).13 In order to control for the huge population differences between 
13 More rarely, scholars may use the discretionary revenues of the local communities 
(Ladd 1993).
[2]
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Vaud municipalities, we use the current expenditures per capita.14 An 
analysis based on expenditures by function is not possible for two reasons. 
On the one hand, the categorisation of expenditures made by local admin-
istrations is unreliable. On the other hand, many small municipalities 
don’t assign public servants to specific functions.
Note that we subtract from the current expenditures two cash drains 
imposed on the municipalities by the cantonal authority: the so-called 
social bill (facture sociale) and the contributions to the equalisation fund. 
The first deduction neutralises the effects of the fluctuating municipal 
participation in financing cantonal social security. The annual size of this 
compulsory expenditure varies according to the evolution of cantonal 
social expenditures and the share of it at the charge of the municipalities. 
Since the social bill and its local share constantly increased between 2001 
and 200515, it is vital to neutralise its impact on the local budget to avoid 
ascribing it to the equalisation grants.
The second deduction is necessary because, for a municipality who is 
a net recipient of the fiscal equalisation, the contribution to the equalisa-
tion fund is just a short-lived expenditure. In fact, this expenditure is 
largely compensated by a larger fiscal equalisation grant. For the same 
reason, we use the net per capita gain of each municipality from the fiscal 
equalisation scheme as indicator of the PH variable. This amount is “net” 
because it is the difference between the amount received from and the 
amount paid to the equalisation fund.
To estimate the impact of an increase in median income on local 
budgets and to compare it with the impact of the equalisation grants, we 
need an indicator reflecting the median income in each municipality. 
Unfortunately, thisindicator for all Vaud municipalities exists only start-
ing from 2005. As a proxy, we reliedon the average cantonal tax paid by 
14 Unless otherwise noted, data comes from the statistical service of the canton of Vaud 
(STATVD). All monetary figures are expressed in constant francs (2005).
15 The social bill amounted globally to 414 millions in 2005, 403 millions in 2004, 325 
millions in 2003 and 293 millions in 2002. In addition, the local share of the bill was 
40% in 2002, 45% in 2003 and 50% from 2004. See http://www.scris.vd.ch/Default.
aspx?docID=6187 for more details. The bill is distribued between the municipalities 
mainly according to their tax effort. This could lead the municipalities toward a higher 
than necessary tax rate in order to artificially reduce their share of the bill. However, 
such phenomenon doesn’t affect the size of the flypaper effect because it would affect 
median voter preferences in the same way as those of the decision-makers.
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local taxpayers. The tax paid is then multiplied for the ratio between the 
cantonal median income and the cantonal mean of the average cantonal 
tax paid in 2005 in order to obtain the measurement order closest to that 
of the median income.
Table 2: Summary statistics of the main variables
Name Indicator Mean S.-D.
EXP
Municipal expenditures per capita less the 
amounts paid to the equalisation fund and for 
the cantonal social bill (at constant prices - 
2005).
2966 783
INC
Local median income (at constant prices - 
2005).
35’703 8’895
PH
Net benefit from the intercommunal fiscal 
equalisation (at constant prices - 2005).
151 68
Note: Mean and Standard-Deviation for the PH are based on 2001-2005 only.
Source: Statistical service of the canton of Vaud (STATVD) 
The operationalisation of the categorical variable B is vital to ensure 
robust results. This exercise is made more difficult by the limited existing 
literature on the relationship between bureaucratic complexity and size 
of the flypaper effect. The ideal indicator would clearly be the ratio between 
the number of public servants and the size of the population. Such an 
indicator wouldn’t simply measure the size of the bureaucracy, but rath-
er its proportionality in regards tomunicipality needs. Unfortunately, this 
solution is not open to us because of data availability: there is no existing 
data on the number of public servants working in the municipalities of 
the canton of Vaud.
However, the expenditures per capita in wages of the municipalities 
are a fair good proxy for the number of public servants16. It is on these 
expenditures that we base our variable measuring bureaucratic complex-
16 At first glance, this indicator could be seen as biased. Indeed, the wage costs (class 30 
of the Swiss chart of accounts) is a good fit when it comes to reflect the complexity 
of public sector in large municipalities. In contrast, it captures this factor less correctly 
for the small ones. Indeed, in the latter category some wage costs are externalised, eg. 
through outsourcing or through unions or associations of municipalities, and are not 
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ity. We first divide these expenditures by the resident population and then 
calculate its logarithm in order to reduce the impact of outliers on the 
extent of the indicator. B+ is equal to 1 for those municipalities for which 
this value exceeds the average by more than one standard-deviation. These 
municipalities are considered as possessing a (relatively) high bureau-
cratic complexity. B- is equal to 1 for those municipalities for which this 
value is lower thanthe average by more than one standard-deviation. These 
municipalities are considered as possessing a (relatively) low bureau-
cratic complexity. Table 2 presents the results of this categorisation.
Table 3: Categorisation of the municipalities according to their bureau-
cratic complexity
 
Categorisation criteria:
 
Distribution of the municipalities 
in three categories according to 
their bureaucratic complexity
Logarithm of wage 
expenditures per capita
Year Mean S.-D.   …high ...average …low
2001 6.282 0.247 67 88 69
2002 6.281 0.251 62 95 67
2003 6.292 0.235 65 84 75
2004 6.270 0.235 62 92 70
2005 6.234 0.236  63 89 72
3. Operationalisation of the control variables
We use four control variables17. First, we wanted to control the potential 
effect of the economies of scale on the expenditures level. Indeed, a large 
municipality is supposed to spread its fixed costs over a larger population 
captured by the group 30 but by the group 31 (supplies and consumables used). 
However, this biais should be relativised. In fact, it could be expected a far lower cost 
of control in the smaller municipalities because of the closer relation between citizens 
and bureaucrats. Therefore, as a proxy of control, our indicator is not undermined 
(and maybe it is even improved) by the fact that the wage costs underestimate the size 
of the public sector in small municipalities.
17 Among these four control variables there is no political variable. This is justified by 
the fact that the municipal fixed effects already capture the influence of the political 
preferences on local expenditures.
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compared tosmaller municipalities (Oates 1972). At the same time, the 
economies of scale could be gradually eroded by the emergence of addi-
tional costs connected with urban congestion. In our equation, the main 
part of these differences is already captured by the fixed effects for each 
municipality. However, the fixed effect doesn’t take into account anyan-
nual increase in population size and the fact that such an increase could 
mechanically decrease public expenditures per-capita. In fact, since pub-
lic services generally adapt with a delay to the demographical evolution, 
it is necessary to control for this factor (Weicher 1970: 380). The POP 
variable, corresponding to the natural logarithm of the resident popula-
tion at the end of the year, aims to take this phenomenoninto account. 
The literature also suggests considering the evolution of the population 
density. Since the robustness tests show that density and population size 
both capture the same variance, we keptonly the variable POP.
The age distribution of the population is often cited as a factor explain-
ing local public expenditures (Weicher 1970: 383). It wasimperative to 
include some variables capturing the effects of this distribution into our 
model because, as noted by Hamilton (1983), overlooking them could lead 
to an overestimation of the flypaper effect. Therefore, we used two indica-
tors: the percentage of the population aged 65 or older (AGED) and the 
percentage of the population aged 14 or younger18 (YNG). As was the case 
for the population, this indicator will capture the impact thatany age 
distributionvariation will have on public expenditures and not the struc-
tural impact of an historical high percentage of old or young people, the 
latter being already captured by the municipal fixed effects.
In 2004, the cantonof Vaud radically changed the distribution of tasks 
between the canton and its municipalities. This change resulted in a strong 
decrease in local expenditures. We used the instrumental variable D4 to 
control for this structural change. For each municipality, this variable has 
in 2004 and 2005 the level the variable DEP (current expenditures) showed 
in 2004. If this factor is correctly specified, its coefficient should be 
negative. In this way, we integratedthe reduction of local expenditures 
arising from the reforminto our model and therefore avoided that its 
effects distort the coefficient estimates of the other variables.
18 The ideal indicator would be the share of residents still in mandatory school (16 years 
or less). However, we dispose only of the data for five years of age class. Then, our 
choice was limited between 14 years or less and 19 or less. Since the first lead to the 
best econometrical estimations, we kept it.
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Table 4: Summary statistics of the control variables
Name Indicator Mean S.-D.
POP
Natural log of the population resident in the 
municipality.
6.15 1.30
AGE
Percentage of the population aged 65 or 
more.
14.89 3.87
YNG Percentage of the population aged 14 or less. 20.39 3.68
D4
Expenditures of the municipality in 2004 
(at constant prices - 2005). Instrumental 
variables used to capture the structural 
impact of the new task distribution between 
the canton and the municipalities.
2836 693
Note: Mean and Standard-Deviation for the D4 are based on 2004-2005 only. 
Source: Statistical service of the canton of Vaud (STATVD).
Empirical section
Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates obtained using the two models 
described above (with and without the categorical variable reflecting 
bureaucratic complexity). We estimate these models both in a linear and 
a log-log form. This precaution is necessary in light of Becker’sobservation 
(1996) that the magnitude of the flypaper effect can strongly decrease 
depending on whether functional form is adopted.
Only two of the four control variables have a significant coefficient: 
POP and D4. The first identifies a decrease in public expenditures per 
capita when the resident population of a municipality increases. How-
ever, this result shouldn’t lead to mistakenly thinking that a higher 
population is correlated with lower public expenditures per capita. In fact, 
the municipality with the largest population (Lausanne) is also the one 
with the highest public expenditures per capita. Our result just indicates 
that a marginal increase of the resident population at the year t leads to 
a decrease in public expenditures per capita of the same year. The second 
variable correctly identifies a clear-cut decrease in local expenditures after 
the new tasks distribution. Finally, marginal variations in the relative size 
of the two age classes that we take into account don’t affect public expen-
ditures per capita in the case of Vaud’s municipalities.
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Table 5: Coefficient estimates for model 1 and model 2 (linear and 
log-log)
 
Model 1 
Linear
Model 1 
Log-Log
Model 2 
Linear
Model 2 
Log-Log
INC
0.007** 
(0.002)
0.106**
(0.026)
0.007** 
(0.002)
0.108** 
(0.025)
POP
-1240.118**
    (243.165)
-0.444**
(0.087)
-1195.061** 
(250.965)
-0.426** 
(0.090)
AGED
-8.273 
(8.108)
-0.051
(0.035)
-8.305
 (8.215)
-0.053 
(0.035)
YNG
12.252 
(8.063)
0.067
(0.049)
11.320 
 (8.038)
0.065
(0.049)
D4
-0.212**
(0.011)
-0.032**
(0.001)
-.214**
 (0.106)
-0.032** 
(0.001)
PH
0.655**
(0.155)
0.011**
(0.002)
0.580**
(0.194)
0.010**
(0.002)
PH × B+ - - 0.476*
 (0.219)
0.005*
(0.002)
PH × B– - - -0.230
(0.297)
-0.003
(0.003)
YEAR
23.002**
(6.447)
0.008**
(0.002)
22.860** 
(6.452)
0.007** 
 (0.002)
R2 0.811 0.799 0.813 0.799
N=2688. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.  
Municipality fixed effects are included in all models.  
**Significant at the 1% level, *significant at the 5% level, “significant at the 10% level.
In its linear form, model 1 shows a strong flypaper effect: for each one 
franc per capita of equalisation grant, expenditures per capita appear to 
increase by 0.66 francs. This result has to be compared with the estimates 
of the impact of an increase in median income on these expenditures. 
The estimate coefficient for INC gives a correct estimation for the income-
effect under the assumption that the municipalities can potentially tax 
all median income. This is actually not the case given that taxpayer income 
is taxed at three levels (federal, cantonal and communal) and that local 
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taxation is limited by cantonal law. For this reason, the estimated coef-
ficient has to be compared to the marginal local tax rate. In 2005, the 
marginal tax rate (local and cantonal together19) for an income of 100’000 
was 16.57% for an unmarried individual without a child, 13.00% for a 
married individual without child and 10.23% for a marriedindividual 
with two children (AFC 2005). If we split this rate equally between the 
municipality and the canton, it means that local marginal taxation was 
between 5.1% and 8.3%. With such figures, the estimate coefficient of 
0.007 means between 8 and 14 cents of expenditure increase for each franc 
of additional median income. This effect is then between 4.5 and 8 times 
lower than the one observed for a franc of equalisation grant. Therefore, 
the equalisation grants seem to haveled to larger expenditures than the 
ones expected according tothe median voter’s preferences.
Model 2 partially confirms our hypothesis of a link between the flypa-
per effect and bureaucratic complexity. On the one hand, the interaction 
between the categorical variable B and the volume of equalisation grants 
PH shows that one franc of equalisation grant leads to a far higher increase 
in expenditure per capita in the municipalities with a more complex 
bureaucracy (B+). In total, the expenditure increase for each franc of 
grant in these municipalities slightly exceeds the unity (0.58+0.48) and 
it is approximately the double the one observed for the municipalities 
with an average bureaucratic complexity (0.58). This result seems to 
indicate that the model of complete bureaucratic power appliesperfectly 
to municipalities with ahigher bureaucratic complexity. On the other 
hand, the estimates for the municipalities with a low bureaucratic com-
plexity are less sharp. Indeed, even if the estimate coefficient for the 
variable PH x B- is negative, indicating an increase in expenditures below 
the average, it is not significant20.
The log-log models enabled us to test the sensitivity of the estimates 
to the choice of functional form. Obviously, the estimated coefficients 
are then elasticities and cannot be directly compared to the estimates 
obtained with the linear form. To nevertheless make a comparison, Table 
6 presents the marginal propensities calculated for the log-log model. The 
19 Data are referred to the capital city Lausanne.
20 For a robustness check, we tested our models (with both fonctional forms) while 
introducing an additionnal interaction term INC x B+. It resulted in a non significant 
and extremely weak coefficient estimate. Therefore, we can conclude that bureaucra-
tic complexity only affects the impact of the received grants.
60 61
marginal propensities are calculated with the means of the involved 
variables.21
Table 6: Estimations of the marginal propensities
 
Model 1 
Linear
Model 1 
Log-Log
Model 2 
Linear
Model 2 
Log-Log
δEXP/δINC 0.007** 0.009** 0.007** 0.009**
δEXP/δPH 0.655** 0.211** 0.580** 0.202**
δEXP/δPH.B+ - - 0.476* 0.098*
δEXP/δPH.B- - - -0.230 -0.063
R2 0.811 0.799 0.812 0.799
**Significant at the 1% level, *significant at the 5% level, 
The Log-Log coefficients are obtained using the mean value of each variable.
The estimated marginal propensities confirm Becker’sinsight (1996): 
the estimated impact of equalisation grants on expenditures is much 
lower with the log-log functional form22 (21 cents for each franc of grant). 
However, unlike Becker’s results, the change of functional form indeed 
reduces the flypaper effect, but does not annihilate it completely. Even if 
the impact of an increase in median income slightly increases (a coeffi-
cient of 0.009 meaning an expenditure increase between 11 and 18 cents 
for each franc of grant) it is still lower than the impact of a franc of 
grant.
Model 2 also shows that the impact of a franc of grant is between half 
and three times higher than the impact of a franc of income in the case of 
the municipalities with a high bureaucratic complexity for which we observed 
an increase of 30 cents each franc of grant. At the same time, the estimate 
coefficient for PH x B-, even if not significant, suggests that for the munic-
ipalities with a low bureaucratic complexity the impact of one franc of grant 
21 The marginal propensities in Table 6 are obtained using all the disposable decimals for 
the estimated coefficients and not only the three decimals reported in Table 5.
22 At this stage, it is impossible to know which of the two models (linear or log-log) offers 
the best estimates. In this paper, we limit ourselves to the observation that our theo-
retical expectations are correct with both functional forms: the flypaper effect appears 
and it is sensitive to the bureaucratic complexity in the two cases.
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tends to be even closer to the impact of one franc of additional income. 
The absence of significance is probably related to the fact that considering 
the size of the population and the size of the bureaucracy, the municipali-
ties with an average bureaucratic complexity are closer to the group with 
low complexity than to the one with high complexity.23
It should be noted that, to ensure that these estimates do not overes-
timate the flypaper effect, it is also necessary to determine if a phenom-
enon of endogeneity exists. Indeed, the equalisation grants are allocated 
in a large part on the basis of the tax capacity of the municipalities. If a 
low level of tax capacity, all other things being equal, leads to a low level 
of expenditures, then there is the risk that the size of the equalisation 
grant received by the municipalities could be determined by the level of 
expenditures. If a mutual positive influence exists between these two 
variables, the risk is to observe an inflation of the estimated coefficients. 
However, a Granger’s causality test (1969) shows that such a risk didn’t 
come into playin our dataset: the relationship between the equalisation 
grants and public expenditures seems to deploy only from the first vari-
able to the second one without any feedback effect.
Finally, it could be asked whether our findings are reflected in the tax 
rates decided upon by the municipalities before and after the introduction 
of the new fiscal equalisation. A macro analysis of the communal tax 
rates gives an affirmative answer and definitively confirms the existence 
of a flypaper effect in the case of the canton of Vaud. For that we observed, 
the mean tax rate between 1999 and 2003 of the municipalities according 
to their bureaucratic complexity in 2001. Figure 4 illustrates the evolution 
of these tax rates.
The figure illustrates a clear decrease in tax rates in 2001 with an aver-
age decrease of 4.1 percentage points for the municipalities with an aver-
age complexity, 4.6 for these with a high complexity and 3.7 for these 
with a low complexity. It should be noted that the decrease became 
stronger for the low complexity municipalities only starting in 2002. These 
results suggest that only approximately half of the equalisationgrant 
amount has been used to reduce the tax rates24. Obviously, this figure 
has to be relativized because of its purely bivariate approach. However, 
23 This phenomenon could also arise from the fact that the variable B is slighty biased 
in the case of the small municipalities, as already discussed in the previous section.
24 We calculate this value using a mean value of 19 francs per capita for each of these 
percentage points and a mean grants amount in 2001 of 154 francs per capita.
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the small difference between the decrease in the municipality with an 
average complexity and these with a high complexity suggests that the 
log-log functional forms is probably the functional form offering the more 
correct estimates.
Figure 4: Mean tax rates according to the bureaucratic complexity 
(1999-2003)
Source: Statistical service of the canton of Vaud (STATVD).
Conclusion
Our results show that the introduction in 2001 of a new fiscal equalisa-
tion between the municipalities in the canton of Vaud leads to the emer-
gence of a flypaper effect. In addition, they also show that the size of this 
flypaper effect depends in part uponthe degree of complexity of the local 
bureaucracy. Indeed, a clear flypaper effect is detected in the municipali-
ties that received the equalisation grants, but it is more pronounced in 
municipalities with a more complex administrative apparatus. In addition, 
a slight trend toward a weaker flypaper effect appears for the munici-
palities with a relatively weaker bureaucracy. It is therefore possible to 
conclude that the bureaucratic complexity is an indicator that could 
predict, at least partially, the size of the flypaper effect generated by an 
equalisation grant. However, the fact that bureaucratic complexity plays 
a role in Swiss municipalities already suggests that this phenomenon could 
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be even more salient when analysing larger federal subunits like the can-
tons.
This conclusion, however, needsto be confirmed by further analysis. 
Indeed, the selected methodological options arose from our desire to 
simplyproceed in a first empirical test of the hypothesis about the vari-
ability of the flypaper effect as afunction of the bureaucratic complexity 
of the grantee community. For this reason, we privileged the estimation 
of relatively simple models and a categorical variable for the bureau-
cratic complexity with only two modalities. Since our first tests are 
positive, they open the road for analysis using more sophisticated vari-
ables and for their application to other cantonal fiscal equalisationpro-
grams in Switzerland.
Despite these limitations, our research shows that it is worthwhile to 
better analyse the way equalisation grants affect public finances in the 
grantee communities. The recommendations of the classical theory helped 
to generalise the use of this type of grants into the federal and cantonal 
fiscal equalisations. However, our empirical analysis clearly shows that 
the reality is more complex and asks for a more detailed observation of 
the context in which such reforms unfold. In fact, classical theory tends 
to too easily ignore the political decision-making process and the interests 
of the involved actors. In this sense, scholars have a role to play in terms 
of furthering the available knowledge and making it available to policy 
makers.
Although we eventually do not produced any policy recommendations 
meant to reduce the flypaper effect, our paper raises one important point 
to keep in mind when evaluating the impact of fiscal equalisation. Fiscal 
equalisation is not a neutral policy instrument from the point of view of 
allocating resources between public and private goods. In fact, the reduc-
tion of fiscal inequalities between communities comes at a cost: the 
amounts formerly used by a community according to the preference of 
its median voters are transferred into another community in a way that 
impairs the decision-making power of its local median voters. This cost 
(in the form of public goods overconsumption) is rarely taken into con-
sideration in policy evaluations that generally limit themselves to the 
observation of the reduced inequalities. However, the question has to be 
posed: is it worth the effort? Indeed, if the aim is to reduce the differ-
ences between the contributive capacities of taxpayers, social policies 
could be instruments with less adverse effects. Since voters seem to have 
a weak influence on decision-making processes, let equalisation money 
64 65
to start in their pockets and not directly in the public budget may reduce 
their “stickiness” and improve the resource allocation through a more 
democratic process.
U
rb
an
 P
u
bl
ic
 E
co
n
om
ic
s 
R
ev
ie
w
  |
  R
ev
is
ta
 d
e 
Ec
on
om
ía
 P
úb
lic
a 
U
rb
an
a
66
References
AFC, administration fédérale des contributions (2005). Impôts sur le revenu et sur la 
fortune des personnes physiques – charge fiscale dans les chefs-lieux des cantons. Berne.
Bae S. and R. Feiock (2004).The Flypaper Effect Revisited: Intergovernmental Grants and 
Local Governance. International Journal of Public Administration 27(8): 577-596.
Bailey S. and S. Connolly (1998).The Flypaper Effect, Identifying Areas for Further 
Research.Public Choice 95: 335-361.
Becker E. (1996). The illusion of fiscal illusion: Unsticking the Flypaper Effect.Public Choice 
86: 85-102.
Bowman J. (1974).Tax Exportability, Intergovernmental Aid, and School Finance Reform.
National Tax Journal 27(2): 163-173.
Bradford D. and W. Oates (1971).Towards a Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental 
Grants.The American Economic Review 61(2): 440-448.
Brennan G. and J. Pincus (1996). A Minimalist Model of Federal Grants and Flypaper 
Effects.Journal of Public Economics 61: 229-246.
Breton A. and Wintrobe R. (1975). The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-Maximizing Bureau: 
A Note on Niskanen’s Theory of Bureaucracy. The Journal of Political Economy 83(1): 
195-208.
Brooks L. and J. Philips (2008). An Institutional Explanation for the Stickiness of Fed-
eral Grants.The Journal of Law, Economics&Organization 26(2): 243-264.
Conybeare J. (1984). Bureaucracy, Monopoly, and Competition: A Critical Analysis of the 
Budget-Maximizing Model of Bureaucracy. American Journal of Political Science 28(3): 
479-502.
Dafflon B. (1995). Fédéralisme et solidarité – Etude de la péréquation en Suisse. Fribourg: 
Institut du fédéralisme.
Dafflon B. (2004). Federal-Cantonal equalisation in Switzerland: An overview of the 
present system and reform in progress. Public Finance and Management 4(4): 521-558.
Dollery B. and A. Worthington (1995). Federal Expenditure and Fiscal Illusion: an 
Australian Test of the Flypaper Hypothesis. Publius 25: 23-34.
Dollery B. and A. Worthington (1996).The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Illusion.Journal 
of Economic Surveys 10(3): 261-297.
Federal Council (2001). Message concernant la Réforme de la péréquation financière et de 
la répartition des tâches entre la Confédération et les cantons, 14 novembre, Berne.
Feldstein M. (1975). Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in Public Education.The Ameri-
can Economic Review 65(1): 75-89.
Gamkhar S. and W. Oates (1996). Asymmetries in the Response to Increased and Decreased 
in Intergovernmental Grants: Some Empirical Findings. National Tax Journal 49(4): 
501-512.
66 67
Granger C. (1969). Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-
spectral Method. Econometrica 37(3): 424-438.
Gramlich E. (1977). Intergovernment Grants: a Review of the Empirical Litterature. In 
W. Oates (dir.) The political Economy of Fiscal Federalism. Lexington Books, Mass: 219-
239.
Hames D. and D. Wills (1987). Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government in Canada.
Economic Inquiry 25: 707-713.
Hamilton B. (1983). The Flypaper Effect and Other Anomalies.Journal of Public Economics 
22(3): 347-361.
Heyndels B. and C. Smolders (1994). Fiscal Illusion at the Local Level: Empirical Evidence 
for the Flemish Municipalities. Public Choice 80: 325-338.
Hines J. and R. Thaler (1995). Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 4: 217-226.
King D. (1984). Fiscal Tiers: the Economics of Multi-Level Government. G. Allen and Unwin, 
London.
Ladd H. (1993). State Responses to the TRA86 Revenue Windfalls: A New Test of the 
Flypaper Effect. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 12(1): 82-103.
McGuire M. (1975). An Econometrical Model of Federal Grants and Local Fiscal Response.
In W. Oates (ed.), Financing the New Federalism. Resources for the Future, Washington: 
115-138.
Miller G. and Moe T. (1983).Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government.The 
American Political Science Review 77(2): 297-322.
Mischler P. and B. Dafflon (2003). Der interkommunale Finanzausgleich in der Schweiz: 
ein Überblick über den direkten Finanzausgleich der Kantone. Gesetzgebungs-Bulletin 
3: XVI-XLV.
Mottu E. (1997). Réforme de la Péréquation Financière et Principe de Subsidiarité. Swiss 
Political Science Review 3(3): 1-19.
Moulton B. (1990). An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate 
Variables in Micro Units. Review of Economics and Statistics 72(2): 334-38.
Niskanen W. (1968). The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy. The American Economic 
Review 58(2): 293-305.
Niskanen W. (1975). Bureaucrats and Politicians. Journal of Law and Economics 18(3): 
617-643.
Oates W. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc, New York.
Oates W. (1979). Lump-Sum Grants Have Price Effects. In P. Miezkowskiet W. Oakland 
(dir.) Fiscal federalism and grants-in-aid. The Urban Institute, Washington DC.
Oates W. (2005). Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism. International 
Tax and Public Finance 12: 349-373.
Romer T. and Rosenthaler H. (1979). Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Econ-
U
rb
an
 P
u
bl
ic
 E
co
n
om
ic
s 
R
ev
ie
w
  |
  R
ev
is
ta
 d
e 
Ec
on
om
ía
 P
úb
lic
a 
U
rb
an
a
68
omy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 93: 
563-587.
Shah A. (2007). A practitioner’s guide to intergovernmental fiscal transfers.InR. Boadwayet 
A. Shah (dir.) Intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Washington: The World Bank. 1-53.
Soguel N. (2004). Comprendre le fonds de péréquation intercommunal vaudois. WorkingPa-
per IDHEAP.
Soguel N. and A. Tangerini (2002). Suppléments péréquatifs: problèmes et évaluation dans 
le contexte vaudois. Working Paper IDHEAP.
Stine W. (1994). Is local government revenue response to federal aid symmetrical? Evidence 
from Pennsylvania county governments in an era of retrenchment.National Tax Jour-
nal 46(4): 799-816.
Strumpf K. (1998). A Predictive Index for the Flypaper Effect.Journal of Public Economics 
69: 389-412.
Tovmo P. and T. Falch (2002). The flypaper effect and political strength. Economics of 
Governance 3: 153-170.
Tullock G. (1975). The Politics of Bureaucracy.Public Affairs Press, Washington D.C.
Weicher J. (1970). Determinants of Central City Expenditures: Some Overlooked Factors 
and Problems. National Tax Journal 23: 379-396.
Widmer T. and S. Rieder (2003). Schweizer Kantone im institutionnellen Wandel. Ein 
Beitrag zur Beschreibung und Erklärung institutioneller Reformen. Swiss Political Sci-
ence Review 9(1): 201-232.
Wilde J. (1968). The Expenditure Effects of Grant-in-Aid Programs. National Tax Journal 
21: 340-348.
Winer S. (1983). Some Evidence on the Effect of the Separation of Spending and Taxing 
Decisions. Journal of Political Economy 91: 126-140.
Wyckoff P. (1991). Testing Bureaucratic Influence on Local School Expenditures by Com-
paring Survey and Expenditure Data. The Review of Economics and Statistics 73(2): 
331-335.
